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The empirical findings for the labour force participation elasticity with regards to 
child prices are varied. While some estimates imply substantial participation gains 
from child care subsidies, others find insignificant effects from child care prices on 
participation decisions. This paper analyzes the elasticity sizes using estimates from 
37 peer-reviewed articles and working papers in the literature. Using meta-analysis 
tools, we attempt to provide a weighted elasticity estimate and variation between 
countries and over time. The results suggest that the elasticity size has a positive 
inverse U-shaped relationship with aggregate labour force participation, and 
decreases with higher rates of part-time work and social spending. The findings 
imply that the impact of changes in child care prices and success of child care 
subsidy policies are correlated with aggregate level factors. 
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1. Introduction  
Child care subsidies, generally defined as any financial support towards the use of 
formal child care services, have long been a staple of developed welfare states. It is an 
attractive policy option, given that it can serve both reallocation goals favoring young 
adults  and  parents,  and  efficiency  goals  through  increased  female  labour  force 
participation and fertility.
1 To test the benefits of child care subsidies actually exist, 
since the late 1980s, a sizable body of literature appeared estimating the elasticity of 
female labor supply with regards to child care prices. This paper provides a meta-
analysis of this literature, both to calculate a reliable elasticity estimate and to explain 
the underlying causes for the variance in estimated elasticity sizes.   
A puzzle arises when considering the empirical findings over time and across 
countries. While earlier studies, such as Blau and Robins (1988), find a large elasticity 
of labour force participation with regards to child care prices in the United States, 
there is a large variation in results when more recent studies from USA and also 
Europe are taken into account. These findings inevitably challenge the hypotheses 
relating  high  female  labour  participation  with  child  care  subsidies.  As opposed  to 
American  studies,  Jongen  (2009)  finds  very  small  effects  of  child  care  prices  on 
labour  supply  of  Dutch  women,  and  comments  that  the  gains  are  not  worth  the 
increase in taxes required to support subsidies. A striking example of variance over 
time can be seen in Sweden. The elasticity values calculated in 1992 by Gustaffson 
and Stafford average out to about -0.5 while  Lundin et. al (2008) find almost no 
significant effects of child care prices on labour force participation. 
A  number  of  explanations  can  and  have  been  offered  for  the  variation  in 
elasticity  sizes.  Estimation  differences  such  as  the  methodology  used  or  sample 
                                            
1 See Blau and Robins (1988), Ribar (1992) for theoretical discussions on the effects of child care 
prices on labour supply.   3 
characteristics can account for some of the differences. Perhaps of bigger interest is 
how macro level variables influence the effect child care prices have on labour force 
participation. Analyzing the effects of child care subsidies in different settings can 
help in understanding when and where they would be most effective (or ineffective). 
This  paper  analyzes  the impact  of  three  basic  aggregate  indicators:  female  labour 
force  participation,  part-time  work  incidence  and  social  spending.  The  sample 
collected allows for an analysis of estimates from 12 countries and around 30 years. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 puts forward three 
hypotheses relating to macro level variables. Section 3 introduces the meta-sample of 
38  articles  that  were  collected,  section  4  presents  preliminary  statistical  results; 
calculating  a  weighted  effect  size,  testing  for  heterogeneity  in  the  sample  and 
checking for publishing bias. Section 5 tests the viability of the hypotheses by using 
meta-regressions aimed at explaining the variation within elasticity estimates in the 
literature. 
    
2.  Hypotheses  
One implicit explanation for the differences in the sizes of the elasticity over time is 
from Lundin et al. (2008).  The authors argue both that further reductions in care 
prices have diminishing effects, and that high labour supply countries are unlikely to 
see significant changes from shifting prices. Countries with high female labour force 
participation are more likely to either have cheap and readily available formal child 
care  or  make  use  of  alternative  informal  care  arrangements,  both  of  which  will 
diminish the effects of further reductions in child care prices. Furthermore, if other 
structural factors, such as the wage structure or working hour flexibility, contribute to   4 
high female employment, the effect of the child care prices on decision making may 
be limited.  
Somewhat paradoxically, low participation figures can also signal characteristics 
that  lead  to  smaller  elasticity  sizes.  Cultural  or  structural  impediments  have  been 
shown to constrain the impact of child care (Van Gameren and Ooms, 2010). Using 
European data, Van der Lippe and Siegers (1994) find that women in very traditional 
networks are unlikely to respond to changes in wages. As child care subsidies are a 
similar incentive, its effects can be influenced by social norms and the definition of 
gender roles. Cross country comparisons support this point. Results from a low female 
employment economy, Italy, and a transitional economy, Romania, are on the lower 
end of elasticity estimates in the literature (Del Boca et. al 2004; Loshkin and Fong, 
2000).  The  two  observations  relating  participation  rates  and  child  care  prices  are 
summed up in hypothesis 1.  
•  Hypothesis  1:  Female  labour  force  participation  has  an  inverse  U-shaped 
relation with the elasticity of labour supply with regards to child care prices.  
The substitution of informal care for formal care is an intuitive explanation for 
why previous literature reviews find that the price elasticity of demand for formal 
child care is much larger than the labour supply elasticity with regards to child care 
(Blau  and  Currie,  2003).  This  is  most  evident  in  the  “part-time  economy”  of  the 
Netherlands where estimates are uniformly smaller or insignificant compared to the 
rest of the literature (Jongen, 2010; Weitzels, 2005). Although parents opt for more 
formal child care in the Netherlands when prices are decreased, this simply crowds 
out informal care without having an effect on participation decisions. The availability 
of  informal  child  care  for  shorter  periods  of  time  can  allow  for  a  greater 
substitutability between formal and informal child care in countries with high part-  5 
time  work  rates.  As  a  result,  hypothesis  2  predicts  that  the  correlation  between 
elasticity sizes and part-time incidence is negative.  
•  Hypothesis 2: An increase in the share of part-time work leads to a smaller 
elasticity of labour supply with regards to child care prices. 
The differences in estimate sizes between Europe and USA are striking: European 
estimates are mostly around 0.1 while American estimates tend to be much larger. The 
variation in social spending and its implications for inequality and child care choices 
may be one explanation for the difference in elasticity sizes. When estimating the 
elasticity size, a one percent increase in a constant child care price will be a smaller 
part of earnings for high income parents and vice versa for low income parents. The 
difference in the effect is even larger when a concave utility function with diminishing 
marginal  returns  from  wages  is  considered.  With  low  earnings,  elasticity  will  be 
higher as child care prices become a larger proportion of wages and an increase in 
prices has a larger absolute impact on utility received from work. Kimmel (1995) 
notes the prevailing notion that high child care costs are a much bigger obstacle to 
employment for low income mothers. Thus, higher dispersion in wages may lead to 
the use of market provided child care by  a relatively small share of high income 
mothers.  This  implies  a  relationship  between  the  effects  of  child  care  prices  and 
inequality in a country. If social spending decreases inequality and hence the amount 
of low income households, it would also lead to smaller elasticity sizes. While its 
hypothesized effects rely mostly on inequality, social spending is preferred over more 
direct  measures  such  as  the  Gini  coefficient  because  social  spending  can  be  an 
indicator for more than income inequality.  With generous non-pecuniary benefits 
(most prominently parental leave) the impact of child care prices in decision making 
can be lower for all parents. Overall, a compressed income setting and non-pecuniary   6 
benefits will lower the aggregate opportunity cost of having children, and therefore 
the effect of child care prices. 
•  Hypothesis 3: Higher social spending leads to a smaller elasticity of labour 
supply with regards to child care prices. 
The hypotheses listed above are intuitive and provide a good starting point for 
analyzing  the  cross  country  and  time  variation  of  estimates.  The  following  meta-
analysis gives the opportunity to check whether or not the intuition holds up to the 
empirical evidence. In terms of the indicators for labour force participation, part-time 
incidence and social spending, the values used are from the year and country of the 
sample the estimate of elasticity is from. For studies with panel data or pooled data 
across years, the median years’ values are used. 
 
2.  Meta Sample  
The sample is collected in three steps to avoid missing any relevant articles. First, the 
Google Scholar search engine was used, searching for the key phrase “labour supply 
child care elasticity.” Second, the references of several articles were scanned. Third, 
the literature reviews of Blau and Currie (2003) and the literature review section of 
Worlich (2006) were used, the former for studies on USA and Canada, and the latter 
for studies from Europe. In total around 50 articles were considered and 38 estimates 
are included in the final sample from 34 different articles. The majority of the studies 
consider  labour  supply  as  labour  force  participation  rather  than  weekly  or  annual 
hours worked. The studies that did use hours worked had to be eliminated since the 
comparison of the two is not possible in terms of the elasticity sizes. The remaining 
articles and estimates used in this paper are listed in table 1. The sample is made up of 
nine working papers, indicated with italic writing in table 1, and 25 articles from peer-  7 
reviewed journals. The number of working papers investigating the elasticity is fairly 
high mostly due to the understandable policy interest. 
  From each article, we collected the calculated elasticity, standard errors, year 
of  the  data  used,  country  and  the  data  source.  In  terms  of  the  methodology,  the 
estimation procedures were checked to see whether or not a dynamic panel regression 
was used and if a multinomial model was employed. Articles using pooled data from 
several years are not considered to be panel studies. As for the sample characteristics, 
estimates from a full sample of married or single women are categorized differently. 
Finally, several results are based on samples of low-income mothers and these too are 
controlled for.   8 
Table 1: Meta-Sample   
Authors / Publishing Year  Elasticity  Standard Error*  Year  Country  Panel  Data Source 
Gong et al. (2010)  -0.287  0.07  2006  Australia  0  HILDA 
Doiron and Kalb (2002)  -0.05  0.03  1997  Australia  0  CCS SIHC 
Doiron and Kalb (2002)  -0.136  0.07  1997  Australia  1  CCS SIHC 
Powell (2002)  -0.2268  0.10  1988  Canada  0  CNCCS 
Baker et al. (2005)  -0.236  0.06  1998  Canada  1  NLSCY 
Cleveland et al. (1996)  -0.388  0.19  1988  Canada  0  CNCCS 
Worlich (2004)  -0.025  0.01  2002  Germany  0  SOEP 
Worlich (2006)  -0.02  0.01  2002  Germany  0  SOEP 
Beblo et. al (2005)  -0.19  0.10  2002  Germany  0  SOEP 
Del Boca et. al (2004)  -0.004  0.01  1998  Italy  0  Bank of Italy 
Wetzels*** (2005)  0  0.07  1995  Netherlands  0  AVO 
Gameren and Ooms (2008)  0.073  0.42  2004  Netherlands  0  SCP 
Jongen (2010)  -0.025  0.01  2008  Netherlands  0  Simulation 
Jongen (2010)  -0.07  0.04  2008  Netherlands  0  Simulation 
Kornstad and Thoresen (2007)  -0.12  0.06  1998  Norway  0  IDS 
Jaumotte (2003)  -0.05  0.03  1992  OECD  1  OECD 
Loshkin and Fong (2000)  -0.17  0.06  1999  Romania  0  RCCES   9 
Loshkin (2004)  -0.12  0.04  1995  Russia  0  RLMS 
Gustaffson Stafford (1992)  -0.4675  0.24  1984  Sweden  0  HUS data 
Lundin et. al (2008)  -0.0019  0.00  2002  Sweden  1  Statistics SE 
Jenkins and Symons (2001)  -0.09  0.04  1989  UK  0  LPS 
Viitanen (2005)  -0.138  0.03  2000  UK  0  FRS 
Blau and Robins (1988)  -0.38  0.19  1980  USA  0  EOPP 
Conelly (1992)  -0.2  0.13  1984  USA  0  SIPP 
Ribar (1992)  -0.74  0.14  1984  USA  0  SIPP 
Anderson (1999)  -0.511  0.26  1997  USA  0  SIPP 
Anderson (1999)  -0.463  0.24  1997  USA  0  SIPP 
Baum (2002)  -0.349  0.12  1991  USA  1  NLSY 
Blau and Robins (1991)  -0.028  0.03  1984  USA  1  NLSY 
Han and Waldfogel (2001)  -0.35  0.13  1992  USA  0  SIPP 
Han and Waldfogel (2001)  -0.6  0.20  1992  USA  0  SIPP 
Hotz and Killburn (1992)  -0.0494  0.08  1986  USA  0  NLSY 
Kimmel (1995)  -0.346  0.18  1988  USA  0  SIPP 
Kimmel (1998)  -0.219  0.49  1987  USA  0  SIPP 
Kimmel (1998)  -0.923  0.29  1987  USA  0  SIPP 
Blau Hagy (1998)  -0.2  0.10  1990  USA  0  NCCS   10 
Tekin (2007)  -0.133  0.08  1997  USA  0  NSAF 
Ribar (1995)  -0.088  0.04  1984  USA  0  SIPP 
Michalopoulos and Robins (2000)  -0.259  0.11  1989  USA/Canada  0  CNCCS 
Michalopoulos and Robins (2002)  -0.156  0.07  1989  USA/Canada  0  CNCCS 
* Bold standard errors are imputed based on a 5% significance level. Bold author names indicate working papers. 
** Only significance of 1% is reported, standard errors calculated based on a t-statistic of 2.32. Macro level indicators used are the averages of 
United States and Canada since the sample used is pooled. 
*** Elasticity not calculated, only insignificance of the effect of prices on labour supply reported.    11 
While using the estimated elasticity rather than a regression coefficient as the 
effect  size  makes  a  comparison  between  studies  convenient,  a  number  of  studies 
calculate the elasticity based on regression coefficients. Hence, there is often no direct 
standard error available to use as a precision factor. In many of these cases, the t-
statistic of the regression coefficient used to calculate the price elasticity could be 
transformed to impute the standard error. However, in some cases, even this is not 
possible  because  utility  derived  from  each  activity  such  as  work  and  leisure  is 
calculated based on a regression analysis and a simulation model is used afterwards to 
check for the elasticity. When the standard error was missing, a significance of 5% is 
assumed and the standard error imputed from the t-statistic. Later, robustness checks 
are performed using an assumed significance level of 10% and 1%. These imputed 
standard errors are marked in table I. 
A final methodological issue that any meta-analysis needs to discuss is the 
independence  assumption,  requiring  that  the  estimates  are  from  different  samples. 
Satisfying this assumption involves a trade-off as fewer estimates can be included or 
averages of estimates from the same sample need to be used which results in loss of 
information. Generally, we use one estimate from each article to avoid issues with this 
assumption.  In  four  cases,  multiple  estimates  are  drawn  from  a  single  article  but 
different subsamples are used. However, especially in the case of American studies, 
many articles use the same data source. Fortunately, these are mostly from different 
years,  with  the  exception  of  Ribar  (1992)  and  Ribar  (1995),  which  use  different 
methodologies  that  are  controlled  for.  The  issue  is  exacerbated  only  in  the  three 
studies from Germany which use the same data source from the same year. This is 
dealt  with  in  the  meta-regression  of  section  5  by  taking  the  average  of  the  three 
calculated elasticity values.   12 
3.  Effect Sizes, Heterogeneity, Independence and Publishing Bias 
Before moving onto the meta-regression and decomposing the elasticity estimates, 
several weighted mean effect sizes are calculated and the heterogeneity in the sample 
discussed. The standard method weighting each study is to use the inverse of squared 
standard errors (Wolf, 1986). Using these weights, weighted means can be manually 
calculated with little difficulty. This is the usual approach in calculating what is called 
“fixed  effect”  sizes.  The  assumption  in  fixed  effect  sizes  is  that  there  is  no 
heterogeneity in the sample and if each study had an infinite number of observations, 
the resulting elasticity estimates would have been equal. Clearly, this is an extremely 
strong assumption. The heterogeneity of the sample can be checked by using what is 
called  a  Q-statistic
2  which  has  a  chi-square  distribution  with  degrees  of  freedom 
equaling the number of effect sizes minus one. In cases where heterogeneity is found, 
a random effect size incorporating greater flexibility can be calculated instead. In this 
case, the weights used are calculated by taking the inverse of squared standard errors 
plus a variance component representing the variation across the sample of effect sizes 
(Wilson, 1999). This means that imprecise studies (those with high standard errors) 
gain more weight while effect sizes with small standard errors lose weight. In table 2, 
both  random  and  fixed  effect  sizes  as  well  as  the  Q-statistic  for  heterogeneity  is 
presented  both  for  the  entire  sample  and  a  subsample  of  American  studies.  The 
purpose of taking the American subsample is to see whether or not the heterogeneity 
is caused by identifiable differences between studies. American studies simply happen 
to be the largest subsample from a single country in the meta-sample. 
                                            
2 
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Where w are weights and ES are effect sizes. 
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Table 2: Weighted Means and Q-Statistics 
  Full Sample  USA Studies Only 
Fixed ES  -0.03  -0.16 
Random ES  -0.12  -0.38 
Q-Statistic (ρ-value)  193.28  59.44 
* All values are significant  0.01 ρ <  
 
According to table 2, the Q-statistics for both the full sample and the subsample of 
American  studies  are  significant.  This  is  not  surprising  given  the  wide  variety  in 
methodology, sample characteristics and contexts the studies were done in. The strong 
significance of the Q-statistic for even the American subsample implies that there is 
substantial heterogeneity among the results that the meta-regression may explain. It 
also gives support for the random effect size to be preferred over the fixed effect size. 
Considering those, the weighted mean elasticity is given as -0.12 in the full sample 
and -0.38 for American studies. The visibly large difference in fixed and random 
effect sizes is because studies with large standard errors also have larger elasticity 
estimates. While using random effects, these studies with larger elasticity estimates 
are designated a higher weight, leading to a larger weighted effect size estimate. The 
use of random effect is also preferred in this particular meta-analysis because a large 
number of standard errors used to weigh estimates are imputed rather than extracted 
from the articles themselves.  
  A further issue raised about meta-analyses in general is publishing bias or 
what is called a “file drawer effect.” The basic argument is that only studies that find 
significant effects or confirm the existing theoretical predictions are published while   14 
the rest are left in a file drawer (Wolf, 1986). In the present sample, an Egger test was 
performed to check for skewness of estimates. The Egger test regresses normalized 
effect sizes, calculated by dividing the effect sizes with the standard errors, with the 
precision factor, which is the inverse of the standard error squared (Egger, 1997). The 
results show significant bias towards negative estimates, but it is unclear whether or 
not this is due to publishing bias or the heterogeneity of the sample and the imputed 
standard  errors.  Considering  the  large  number  of  working  papers,  the  latter  two 
explanations seem more plausible than genuine publishing bias.  
 
4.  Meta-Regression: Testing the Hypotheses 
In  this  section,  the  macro  level  hypotheses  of  section  2  are  tested  using  meta-
regressions. Based on the significant Q-statistics, we employ a random effects model 
that  allows  for  heterogeneity  between  the  estimates.  The  regression  equation 
estimated is given below: 
' ' i i X Z v β γ φ ε = + + +  (1) 
  In equation (1),  β  is the elasticity estimate of each study,  X  are several 
control  variables  relating  to  sample  and  methodological  characteristics,  and  Z  
represents the macro level variables. The total residual is made up of two parts,  i ε  is 
the  error  term  while  i v   is  the  between  study  variance  component.  To  control  for 
sample differences, indicator variables are added for studies that estimate effects for 
only  low  income,  married  or  single  women.  Methodological  choices,  the  use  of 
multinomial or panel models, are also controlled for.  
  Figures for female labour force participation and the incidence of part-time 
workers among employed women have been retrieved from OECD (2010) statistics. 
The labour force participation values are for women between the ages 15 and 64.   15 
There are a few years missing in the data for incidence of part-time work in various 
countries, for these the closest possible year is used instead. Interpolating for part-
time is avoided since it correlates and varies with business cycles (Buddelmeyer et al., 
2004). OECD data is also used for social spending expenditures as a share of GDP. 
Unfortunately, data is given for every five years until 2000. Once again, the closest 
possible  year’s  value  is  used  for  cases  where  data  is  not  available.  Appendix  B 
provides  a  robustness  check  for  the  estimates  based  on  interpolations  for  missing 
years derived from the rate of change in the available bi-decal data. Table 3 provides 
summary statistics for all variables and table 4 shows the correlation between macro 
level indicators. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Meta-Regression Variables 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Effect Size  38  -0.23  0.22  -0.92  0.07 
Standard Error  38  0.12  0.11  0.04  0.49 
LFP  38  66.69  5.55  47.90  78.60 
Part-Time 
(% Employment) 
38  28.53  13.03  4.70  60.20 
Social Spending* 
(%GDP) 
37  17.19  4.42  13.10  29.50 
* Missing data for Loshkin (2004) from Russia 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Aggregate Variables 





LFP  1     
Part-Time (% 
Employment) 
0.15  1     16 
Social Spending 
(%GDP) 
0.32  0.43  1 
* Missing data for Loshkin (2004) from Russia. 
**  For  Frog  and  Loshkin  (2005),  the  value  used  for  social  spending  is  from 
EUROSTAT and 2005 rather than OECD. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Elasticity Sizes 































































2  35.09%  14.7%  47.37% 
N  38  37  37 
 
Results  for  three  separate  regression  fits  are  presented  in  table  5.  Note  that  the 
elasticity  values  are  negative  meaning  that  negative  coefficients  imply  a  larger   17 
elasticity and vice versa. Model I includes the full sample of 38 estimates and macro 
level  variables  for  part-time  work,  labour  force  participation  and  labour  force 
participation squared. An additional control is added in this case for the study of 
Loshkin (2004) from Russia because it is an outlier with the 4% part-time incidence 
rate. The Loshkin (2004) article is dropped in models II and III due to missing data for 
social spending. It is difficult to interpret the methodological or sample characteristic 
controls because several of them are based on a very small number of observations. A 
Wald test on the labour force participation variables reveals significance at the 1% 
level, meaning that both part-time and labour force participation have a significant 
effect on the elasticity  estimate. Hypothesis 1 receives support as the relationship 
between the elasticity size and participation rate is positive but inverse U-shaped. 
Appendix A presents the exact effects at different rates of participation according to 
the coefficients found in model I. The effects of participation on elasticity peak at 
about 55%, which many developed countries have long surpassed. To put this into the 
current context, according to OECD statistics (2011), the labour force participation 
rate among OECD countries was at 61.5% in 2009, while the corresponding value is 
65.8% for EU-15 countries. 
It is possible to argue for reverse causality based on the coefficients of labour 
force participation because elasticity values may imply that governments can take 
advantage of participation responsiveness by increasing child care subsidies and thus 
participation.  Alternatively,  higher  elasticity  values  could  mean  more  involvement 
with the labour market. However, the female participation figure used here is for the 
entire working age population of women rather than only women in an age group with 
high  fertility  who  are  most  likely  to  be  affected  by  changes  in  child  care  prices. 
Furthermore, while reverse causality argument could be plausible for the negative   18 
effect  found,  it  is  not  for  the  diminishing  effects.  If  any  quadratic  effects  were 
expected at all, the prediction would be to have a convex relationship, such as that of 
a usual cost function, between participation rates and elasticity sizes if the elasticity 
size was driving participation rates higher. 
3 
Hypothesis 2 also receives support in both models I and III because increased 
incidence  of  part-time  work  is  correlated  with  a  smaller  elasticity  estimate.  The 
studies from the Netherlands could be introducing a spurious correlation here if the 
low elasticity values found in Dutch studies are due to some other underlying factor. 
However,  Appendix  B  presents  the  results  for  model  IIIb  which  controls  for  the 
studies from Netherlands. The estimated effects continue to be positive with higher 
rates of part-time work being significantly  correlated with smaller elasticity sizes, 
even though the coefficient is unsurprisingly smaller.  
  Model II and III test for the third hypothesis and include social spending as a 
percentage  of  GDP  as  an  independent  variable.  If  participation  rate  and  part-time 
incidence are not included, model II shows that social spending is indeed significantly 
correlated with smaller elasticity estimates. Conversely, in model III, including both 
the  participation  and  part-time  incidence  variables  leads  to  an  insignificant  social 
spending coefficient. In separate, unreported regressions, including only one of part-
time incidence of participation rate variables still resulted in significant estimates of 
effects from social spending. The insignificance in model III may be due to multi-
collinearity  since,  as  table  3  shows,  social  spending  is  positively  and  strongly 
                                            
3 To clarify this point, consider female participation, P  as a quasi-linear function of 
child care price elasticity, ε , the amount of subsidy, s, and a composite entry 
representing various other factors influencing participation,  X , and writing the 
function as: ( )






= , giving elasticity as a convex function of participation.   19 
correlated with both labour force participation and part-time incidence. Thus, unless 
omitting part-time work, or labour force participation, leads to a bias in the estimate, 
hypothesis 3 finds some support. 
To  control  the  sensitivity  of  the  results,  several  robustness  checks  are 
performed and reported in Appendix B. In table 6, the same models are fitted where 
for  articles  without  reported  standard  errors;  a  significance  level  of  10%  is  used 
instead of the previous 5%. This is, in effect, a fairly strong sensitivity check as well, 
since  decreasing  the  weight  placed  on  a  large  number  of  articles  automatically 
diminishes  the  total  variance.  Neither  the  signs  nor  the  significances  of  the 
institutional variables change as a result except for the less significant effects of social 
spending in model II. Similarly, in unreported checks, assuming a significance level 
of 1% was seen to have little effect on the results. Additionally, in table 7, model III is 
fitted again, using a control for the Netherlands and interpolated values from a trend 
for missing years in social spending data rather than using the closest year possible. 
Once again, results do not alter significantly. 
 
5.  Discussion 
The effects of child care prices on female labour supply is largely agreed and found to 
be negative despite some recent studies showing smaller or insignificant effect sizes 
in various countries. This has led to a widespread view of child care subsidies as a 
rather strong policy tool for increasing female participation. However, the comparison 
or application of elasticity sizes from and to different countries seems to be an almost 
futile exercise. While the full meta-sample showed a weighted mean of about -0.12, 
the American only subsample’s weighted mean is -0.38. The underlying reasons for   20 
these differences could help give a better overview of what is being found in micro-
level research. 
While tentative, the meta-regression results of section 5 show that a portion 
variation in elasticity sizes can be explained through country level structural factors. 
Labour force participation rate has a positive yet diminishing relationship with the 
elasticity size, while part-time work and social spending decrease it. Even if high part-
time work and social spending are relatively policy based options that vary largely 
across  countries,  labour  force  participation  is  rising  across  all  developed  and 
developing countries, implying that price based policies for child care may diminish 
in effectiveness. The continuing increase in labour force participation and part-time 
incidence,  when  combined  with  the  results  of  this  study,  explain  the  time  trend 
towards smaller elasticity findings that is observed in the literature at large. For high 
participation or high part-time countries like Sweden, Norway or the Netherlands, 
further  policy  focus  on  child  care  prices  appears  unproductive.  Considering 
alternatives to costs, such as the quality of care offered, could help induce untapped 
participation effects. Already, quality of care has been examined in terms of child care 
demand and supply (Blau, 1998; 2002), but its links to labour supply needs further 
analysis. 
On the other end of the spectrum, in developing countries or countries with 
low rates of female participation, it appears overly optimistic to base labour market 
policy and projections on implementing price based policies like child care subsidies. 
In countries with low female labour market participation, the elasticity is small despite 
also having relatively lower social spending and part-time rates, owing presumably to 
more structural and cultural reasons. Simple transplantation of high rate countries’   21 
policies with regards to female participation is unlikely to pay off at the level that it 
might have for the benchmark countries. 
While the sample used in this paper included the more extensive literature that 
calculates  the  participation  elasticity,  questions  remain  about  hours  elasticity.  The 
effects of the various macro variables could presumably differ between the external 
margin, the decision to participate, and the internal margin, the decision to work more 
or less hours. The effects on the internal margin become even more important when 
high  and  increasing  part-time  rates  in  some  countries  are  taken  into  account.  As 
further  micro  level  studies  become  available  using  hours  elasticity,  it  should  be 
possible to extend the analysis to how hours elasticity is influenced by the labour 
market or institutional factors.  
Appendix A:  
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Table 6: Meta-Regression Results with 10% Significance Imputation 































































2  30.55%  -9.06%  47.82% 
N  38  37  37 
* Unreported regressions based on missing standard errors imputed for a significance 
level of 1%, once again the results change very little. 
 
Table 7: Further Checks; Netherlands Control and Interpolated Social Spending 































2  41.18% 
N  38 
* Model III adds a control for studies from the Netherlands to check for changes in 
the  significance  of  part-time  incidence  variable  as  well  as  changing  the  social 
spending indicator to interpolated values from closest available year values. 
**  No  values  could  be  interpolated  for  social  spending  for  several  countries  like 
Romania, since data was insufficient to construct a trend and growth rate. 
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